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2Summary
‡ Information security “breaches” take many forms and occur in a wide variety of settings. 
However, contrary to recent press reports, they do not appear to be increasing.
‡ Research indicates that only a small percentage of breaches result in any harmful use of 
data.
‡ Account fraud and true identity fraud — the two identity-based frauds most feared by con-
sumers and policy makers — are actually declining. 
‡ The vulnerability of unsecured personal data and the threat of identity-based frauds neverthe-
less continue to grow and evolve as perpetrators become more sophisticated in how they 
seek to obtain and exploit personal information. 
‡ That threat, and particularly the risk of synthetic identity fraud, poses real dangers for indi-
viduals, institutions, and the information economy. 
‡ Action to combat that threat must be thoughtful, well targeted, and forward-looking if it is to 
guard against new risks and do so without compromising the information-based services that 
the public increasingly enjoys and expects.
Introduction
The unprecedented number of disclosures about information security “breaches” during the first half of 
2005 has brought into sharp focus the importance of securing personal information. To date, however, 
concerns about vulnerabilities in information systems have not consistently translated into a better 
understanding of threats to information, the tools available for securing it, or the challenges faced in 
employing those tools. In short, the perceived need to “do something” threatens to overwhelm the need 
to first understand what needs to be done. 
This paper highlights what we know about recent breaches, the risks they pose for individuals and 
institutions, and the important lessons we have learned about information security threats, tools, and 
priorities. Future papers will address other aspects of information security and the tools available for 
protecting it.
The lessons from recent breaches and related information security research demonstrate that the risk 
to consumers of most breaches is not as great as popular rhetoric suggests. However, unchecked, 
information security breaches pose real risks for individuals, institutions, and the information economy. 
Moreover, the threat is constantly evolving to exploit weaknesses in data protection. Understanding 
those risks and their changing nature is critical to ensuring that new laws, technologies, and other 
measures target the most serious threats and provide the public with real security.
Recent Breaches
‡ There is no evidence that information security breaches are increasing. The numerous 
disclosures about breaches during the first half of 2005 resulted from a combination of a significant 
number of breaches involving data about many consumers and a California law requiring entities 
that maintain personal data to disclose when those data may have been acquired by unauthorized 
users.1 Under the California law, it does not matter whether the breach was deliberate or accidental 
or whether the data were misused. Most businesses have chosen to provide the notices required 
under the law to all U.S. residents affected, not just those in California.
‡ Information security “breaches” take many forms. These include lost or misplaced disks or 
backup tapes, stolen laptops and cell phones, hacked data, improperly secured websites, data lost 
or stolen in transit, information taken by rogue 
employees, misdirected mail, and many other 
forms. California data suggest that most are 
accidents, rather than the result of deliberate 
attacks, and many are not so much “breaches” 
as incidents in which data may — or may not 
— have been compromised. Most of these 
incidents do not involve the Internet or other 
digital technologies. In fact, many involve lost or 
misplaced information or equipment, rather than 
theft. 
‡ Breaches occur in a wide variety of settings, 
including many industry sectors, government 
agencies, universities, and the not-for-profit 
community.
Examples of Types of Security Breaches (2005)
Type of Breach Recent Examples and Dates Announced
Fraudulent account created ChoicePoint (2/15/05)
Stolen laptop/computer
UC Berkeley (/11/05); NV Dept. of Motor Vehicles (/12/05); MCI 
(4/5/05); CA Dept. of Health Services (4/15/05); Motorola (5/0/05); 
Bank of America (7/29/05)
Hacking
DSW/Retail Ventures (/8/05); Boston College (/11/05); 
Northwestern Univ. (/20/05); Polo Ralph Lauren/HSBC (4/14/05); 
CardSystems (6/16/05)
Passwords compromised LexisNexis/Seisint (/10/05)
Theft by insider/employee
GA Dept. of Motor Vehicles (4/05); Wachovia, Bank of America, 
PNC Financial Services Group, & Commerce Bancorp (4/28/05); 
Univ. of Hawaii (6/18/05)
Missing back-up tape
Bank of America (2/25/05); Ameritrade (4/20/05); Time Warner 
(5/2/05); CitiFinancial (6/6/05); City National Bank (7/6/05)
Source: Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm)
TYPES OF BREACHES
July 2003–March 2005 (45 incidents)
Source: California Office of Privacy Protection (Mar. 11, 2005).
4‡ It appears that only a small percentage of breaches actually involve any harmful use of data. 
There are many reasons for this, including: 
‡ Many incidents described as information security breaches involve no effort to misuse data at 
all. Data may be lost, rather than stolen, or obtained incidental to the theft of some other valu-
able commodity and discarded or destroyed without ever being accessed (for example, a laptop 
that is stolen for the value of the machine and immediately wiped clean so that it can be used by 
someone else).
‡ Not all attempted misuses are successful; industry efforts to detect and block fraudulent charges 
and illicit access to accounts are highly 
successful. The financial services indus-
try, for example, intercepts and blocks 
many fraudulent credit card charges.
‡ Even the portion of those efforts to 
misuse personal information that are 
successful usually result in no financial 
or physical harm to consumers. The most 
recent data available indicates that 67% 
of victims of identity-based frauds report 
suffering no economic loss and paying 
no out-of-pocket expenses. The costs 
were usually paid by businesses, and 
ultimately by all consumers.2 
As a result, many of the breaches that 
were reported as involving data concern-
ing the largest number of people may 
in fact affect very few. Visa estimates 
that 2% of compromised credit card numbers are used fraudulently. Other evidence collected 
in a July 2005 study by Thomas Lenard and Paul Rubin suggests that the percentage may be 
lower.4
‡ Information security breaches are among the least common ways that personal information 
falls into the wrong hands. In 2005, for the half of victims of identity-based frauds who reported 
knowing from where their information had been obtained, the most common source of personal 
information, by a factor of two to one over any other category, was “lost or stolen wallet, checkbook 
or credit card.”5 Family members and relatives along with friends and neighbors make up half of all 
known identity thieves.6 Consumers often end up unwittingly providing thieves with access to sensi-
tive data by failing to secure their own data, by responding to fraud schemes, such as phishing and 
pharming, and by careless use of their personal information. 
Identity-Based Fraud
‡ The risk most associated with information security breaches in the minds of many consum-
ers and policy makers is identity theft or, more accurately, “identity-based fraud.” That term 
includes a variety of crimes. Regulators and researchers usually divide these into three categories.
SECTORS AFFECTED BY BREACHES
July 2003–March 2005 (45 incidents)
Source: California Office of Privacy Protection (Mar. 11, 2005).
5‡ The first and most prevalent is “account fraud.” Account fraud involves conducting unauthorized 
transactions on somebody else’s account (e.g., one person using another person’s stolen credit 
card). While this type of activity is facilitated by access to personal information (e.g., a bank 
account number of credit card number), it has little in common with the other forms of identity-
based fraud and has existed as long as there were credit cards or checks to steal. Account fraud 
is usually easy to detect because the fraudulent transactions appear on the victim’s monthly 
account statements. Congress and state legislatures have adopted strict laws in an attempt to 
prevent and punish account fraud and industry is successful in blocking most efforts to commit 
account fraud.7
‡ “True identity fraud” involves opening a new account using the identity of another consumer. 
The victim may never know of the new account’s existence until he or she applies for a mort-
gage or loan and discovers the unknown account when the credit report is checked, or when 
the creditor attempts to collect on the debt from the victim after the perpetrator has defaulted. 
Congress requires the three national credit bureaus to provide consumers, upon request, with a 
free credit report each year to assist consumers in detecting true identity fraud early, before they 
need credit themselves.8
‡ The third and newest type of identity-based fraud is “synthetic identity fraud.” This involves 
combining the identity elements of real people with fabricated identity elements to create a new 
identity. Synthetic identity fraud poses significant risks for businesses and others that grant 
credit or provide products and services to the nonexistent, “synthetic” person. It also can harm 
the individuals whose information was combined and who later may be associated erroneously 
with the fraud. And it can be very dangerous for society more broadly if the frauds perpetrated 
by the creators of the synthetic identifies become widespread or if those identities are used 
by terrorists to gain access to airplanes, government buildings, or other critical infrastructure. 
Synthetic identity fraud is the hardest to detect and may, in fact, not be visible for years, as 
thieves develop credit records for the new identities they have created. 
	 Account fraud, true identity fraud, and synthetic identity fraud are three different types of crimes. 
While press reports and policy makers often lump them together, it is useful to treat them sepa-
rately because they often involve different types of criminal activity and require different types of 
responses. 
‡ Account fraud and true identity fraud are not as prevalent as press reports suggest and do 
not appear to be increasing. Two identical studies by Synovate that took place in late 200 and 
early 2005 provide considerable insight into the reality of identity-based frauds. They show that the 
number of victims is declining in real terms and as a percentage of the U.S. population.
	 According to the 2005 Javelin study, 1 out of 2 adult Americans was a victim of an identity-based 
fraud in 2004.9 That is a significant number, but it is a far cry from the claim in recent press reports 
that the figure is 1 out of 4. That claim appears to reflect more about the vagueness and breadth 
of the term “identity theft” than about the reality of how frequently these crimes occur. According to 
the FTC’s 2003 study, 38 percent of people who identified themselves as victims of “identity theft” 
said that they previously had reported the theft to no one — not even their own bank or credit card 
company — suggesting that even the 1 in 23 figure may be exaggerated.
	 Other evidence appears to confirm the findings of the Synovate studies. The 2005 Nilson Report 
on credit card fraud reports that the total cost of such fraud — according to the Federal Trade 
6Commission, the largest component of identity-based fraud — to card issuers decreased 10% from 
$882 million in 200 to $788 million in 2004.10 From 1992 to 2004, the Nilson Report found that the 
cost of credit card fraud had fallen by more than two-thirds from $.157 to $.047 per $100 in credit 
card sales.11 Fraudulent charges are lower as a percentage of credit card use in the United States 
than anywhere else in the world.12
The Evolving Threat
‡ Society’s growing reliance on information technologies exacerbates both the threat posed 
by personal information in the wrongs hands and the dangers of poorly focused or exces-
sive regulation intended to guard against that threat. Information today increasingly substitutes 
for personal relationships and for currency. This is especially true in Internet-facilitated transactions 
which include, for example, a majority of stock trades, consumer banking interactions, and airline 
reservations. Unfortunately, the convenience, customization, lower cost, and heightened consumer 
expectations that information enables also create new opportunities for abuse, as the development 
of identity-based crimes over the past decade demonstrates. As a result, the threat continues to 
grow and efforts to combat that threat inevitably run the risk of interfering with valuable information-
based services.
‡ There is ample evidence that both the risk of unsecured personal data and risks and the 
potential impact of identity-based frauds are growing and evolving. For example:
‡ Recent breaches demonstrate an evolution of attack strategies. As one vulnerability in informa-
tion security systems was identified and patched, attacks evolved to target other weak spots. 
Moreover, as leading companies enhanced their information security, attacks have clearly 
increased against less well prepared institutions.
Synovate Studies
200 (FTC) 2005 (Javelin)
Annual cost $51.4 billion $52.6 billion
Number of victims 10.1 million 9. million
% of U.S. adult population affected 4.7% 4.25%
Total resolution time
. million 
hours
260.4 million 
hours
Median resolution time  hours 28 hours
% of victims who spent 9 hours or less on resolution 64% 68%
% of victims who paid no out-of-pocket expenses 6% 67%
% of thieves who are friends, family members, or neighbors 5% 50%
Sources: Synovate, Federal Trade Commission — Identity Theft Survey Report (200); Javelin Strategy & Research, 2005 Identity Fraud 
Survey Report.
7‡ Many identity-based frauds reflect key similarities — e.g., common addresses, phone numbers, 
targets, and strategies — that cause law enforcement officials to believe they are orchestrated 
by well organized and financed perpetrators. Information security breaches pose more signifi-
cant risks as the sophistication of fraud rings increases.
‡ Historically, the large majority of reported identity-based fraud has involved either account 
fraud or true identity fraud. These are the types of fraud that most studies measure and that 
appear to be declining. There is emerging evidence, however, that synthetic identity fraud is 
growing. Synthetic identity fraud is harder to track and may take years to detect, but it appears 
increasingly clear that synthetic identity fraud accounts for a significant and growing portion of 
identity-related fraud.1 Security breaches can significantly facilitate synthetic identity fraud by 
providing access to a large volume the disparate pieces of personal information about individu-
als often used to create synthetic identities.
‡ Information security breaches pose real risks for individuals. Compromised information can 
cause problems that are time-consuming and frustrating for individuals to remedy. The 2005 Javelin 
study reported that while two-thirds of victims lost no money and spent less than 9 hours remedying 
the results of identity-based frauds, the burden on the remaining third is so great that the average 
(mean) out-of-pocket cost per victim is $650 and the time spent to resolve the fraud is 28 hours.14 
Moreover, breaches can threaten privacy and thereby affect consumers even if no identity-based 
fraud results. 
‡ Security breaches also pose significant risks for businesses. One reason that the financial 
impact on consumers is relatively small is that most of the cost is borne by businesses. In 2004, 
U.S. business suffered $50 billion in losses from identity-based frauds.15 Moreover, businesses 
suffer even greater financial loss through the loss of consumer and market confidence when a 
breach occurs. A 2003 study found that firms victimized by an information security compromise that 
involved theft of credit card information suffered a stock market loss of 9.% on the day the incident 
was announced, increasing to 14.9% over three days.16 Lenard and Rubin noted that this “cost is 
quite large — three to five times the amount found in similar studies for other classes of events.”17 
Businesses also risk lawsuits, the cost of increased government oversight, and the burden of regu-
latory investigations and compliance.
‡ The online economy is especially at risk. Repeated studies show that consumers will stay away 
from electronic services, such as online banking, if they do not feel that their personal informa-
tion is secure. This could significantly increase their vulnerability to identity-based fraud because 
information is statistically more secure online than offline. Moreover, online services are often more 
convenient and efficient and less expensive than comparable offline transactions. Online commerce 
has contributed significantly to nationwide competition and the availability of new and innovative 
services, so consumers and businesses could be seriously harmed if it lags. Even if tangible harm 
from security breaches is comparatively small, as indicated by recent studies, intangible harms and 
other fears can greatly increase the cost of such incidents. Those costs can be considerable for 
enterprises that rely on personal information, consumers, and the online economy as a whole. 
Conclusion
The lessons from recent experience and research indicate that the risk to consumers of information 
breaches is not as great today as news coverage might suggest. Nevertheless, there is still reason for 
8concern. Information technology is changing the way we do everything. Information is the currency of 
our lives; it has enormous value. That is why concerted efforts are underway to steal and misuse it. 
The threat is continuously changing to exploit weaknesses in data protection. As a result, the risk to 
consumers, businesses, and the economy is growing. Action to combat that risk is essential. However, 
that action must be thoughtful, well targeted, and forward-looking if it is to cope successfully with new 
threats and do so without compromising the information-based services that our economy relies upon 
and the public increasingly enjoys and expects.
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